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Abstract: This paper explores the relation of Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct to the Stoic 
notion of oikeiosis. Initially, oikeisosis is set against Platonic homoiosis, specifically as discussed in 
the Alcibiades, which provides what Foucault calls the “Platonic model” of conduct. The paper 
examines what Foucault means by “care of the self” and points to its difference from the Delphic 
maxim “know yourself” that centered on a principle of homoiosis, or ethical transcendence. Noting 
how the problematic of care of the self leads to what Foucault calls “the government of conduct,” 
the paper considers the possibility of “counter-conduct.” Given that Foucault has argued that the 
autonomy of conduct has been rendered invisible through its “juridification,” this paper proceeds 
with a genealogy of the codification of morals in natural law theory. This culminates with the 
sixteenth century return to Stoicism in the person of Grotius. Showing that a certain conception of 
counter-conduct present in Gerson is transformed in natural law theory into a juridical grounding 
of the government of conduct, this paper draws out the immanent relation of conduct and 
counter-conduct in the notion of appropriation. Arguing that Grotius has fundamentally 
misunderstood the concept of oikeiosis, which he takes from Cicero and which subtends his theory 
of appropriation, this paper suggests that a return to the early Stoic formulation of oikeiosis allows 
for a rethinking of the problem of the government of conduct. A certain moralization of action, 
irreducible to codification that is present in early Stoic thought provides a model of “counter-
conduct.” Ultimately, “care of the self,” as it is given in Stoic philosophy, relates the subject of 
action to the principle of ethical immanence that grounds Foucault’s critique of the subject. 
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Introduction 
In a footnote to the English translation of Foucault’s The Hermeneutics of the Subject, a distinction is 
made, which arguably structures much of Foucault’s late work, between ethical immanence and 
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ethical transcendence.1 It makes reference to a passage from Plato’s Thaetetus, widely quoted by 
middle Platonists, which emphasizes the importance of the concept of homoiosis to theo 
(“assimilating oneself to God”). This concept came to be understood as “the expression of the telos, 
the expression of the sovereign good”2 and was taken up by a variety of traditions including Neo-
Platonists, Peripatetics, Jewish and Christian mystics, and Neo-Pythagoreans. Significantly, this 
concept was positioned as a kernel of Foucault’s critique of subjectivity as early as his first 
lectures at the Collège de France, insofar as it subtends a conception of ethics beginning with 
“prohibition, renunciation, passage to the universal.”3 Homoiosis, then, is the “principle of ethical 
transcendence,” and always involves “an effort of tearing away from the world.” This principle 
must be distinguished from, or perhaps even opposed to, the notion of oikeiosis found in the Stoics, 
in which “the first telos [i.e., the sovereign good] remains,” though it is arrived at through an 
“exercise of immediate articulation on a nature good in itself.” Oikeiosis, in this way, provides the 
“principle of ethical immanence.”4 
 This paper begins with an examination of Foucault’s critique of the dominant mode of 
relation with oneself in Western thought that takes the form of self-knowledge, and proceeds to 
examine what Foucault, in his late ethical work, calls “care of the self.” Care of the self is 
construed by Foucault primarily as a process of self-transformation through the application of 
various “technologies of the self.” Looking at Foucault’s analysis of Plato’s Alcibiades, this paper 
unpacks what Foucault has in mind when he speaks of the “Platonic model” of self-
transformation and the way in which it leads, given its reliance on the ideal of homoiosis, to a 
covering up of care of the self by self-knowledge. Next, following Arnold Davidson, this paper 
considers the problem of conduct and its immanent relation to “counter-conduct,” during the 
period of the emergence of what Foucault calls “governmentality.” In particular, the relation 
between government of self and government of others is explored. This emergence of 
governmentality, Foucault argues, led to a “juridification” of conduct that has deprived it of its 
autonomy and its force. In order to understand this point, this paper takes a look at the 
emergence of theories of natural and subjective right in the sixteenth century, starting with the 
counter-conduct of Jean Gerson, and ending with the legal codification of morality in Grotius. 
This, the paper argues, forms the conceptual foundation for the development of the general 
problem of the government of conduct. This foundation completes a movement from the 
discovery in real struggle of an ethical power that might provide access to the truth of oneself, to 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-82 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 434n7. Interestingly, Foucault also uses the term “ethical transcendence” in his doctoral thesis 
on the history of madness. See, Michel Foucault, History of Madness, translated by Jonathan Murphy (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 69, 71. 
2 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 434n7. 
3 Michel Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1970-1971, and Oedipal Knowledge, 
edited by Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 215. 
4 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 434n7. 
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the knowledge of what power is that establishes the universality of this truth. In other words, the 
very power that opens to counter-conduct in early natural law theory, becomes a principal of 
ethical transcendence by the sixteenth century, through the institution of a kind of sovereign 
subject. Finally, through a critique of Grotius’ model of appropriation, which depends on his 
(mis)use of the Stoic notion of oikeioisis, this paper concludes that the conceptual foundations of 
the government of conduct can be rethought through a return to the early Stoic understanding of 
appropriation and its principle of ethical immanence. 
 
“Know yourself” and care of the self 
It has been frequently asserted that the Delphic injunction “know yourself [gnothi seauton]” is the 
founding expression of the Western philosophical tradition. For Foucault, this is problematic 
insofar as it has provided the primary mode of relation that the human subject establishes with 
itself in order to access truth. Much of Foucault’s late work is preoccupied with a critique of this 
relation of the subject to itself mediated through knowledge, as well as an elaboration of 
alternative forms of the relation between the subject and truth. Foucault’s later genealogy of 
subjectivity, in this sense, focuses on an inquiry into instituted models of self-knowledge. As was 
the case in his early work, this genealogy revolves around the question of how the subject is 
established, in different institutional contexts, “as a possible, desirable, or even indispensable 
object of knowledge.”5 However, the “guiding thread” for this later genealogy of subjectivity is 
what Foucault calls “techniques of the self”: 
The guiding thread that seems the most useful for this inquiry is constituted by what one might 
call the “techniques of the self,” which is to say, the procedures, which no doubt exist in every 
civilization, suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their identity, 
maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations of self-
mastery or self-knowledge. In short, it is a matter of placing the imperative to ‘know oneself’ – 
which to us appears so characteristic of our civilization – back in the much broader 
interrogation that serves as its explicit or implicit context: What should one do with oneself? 
What work should be carried out on the self? How should one ‘govern oneself’ by performing 
actions in which one is oneself the objective of those actions, the domain in which they are 
brought to bear, the instrument they employ, and the subject that acts?6 
If the philosophical question is how the subject has access to the truth, Foucault argues that 
another question must be added, which he calls the question of “spirituality”: what 
transformations in the being of the subject are necessary for access to the truth?  
 In the first lecture on The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault distinguishes philosophy 
from spirituality. He suggests that philosophy is the “form of thought” that asks “not of course 
what is true and what is false, but what determines that there is and can be truth and falsehood 
and whether or not we can separate the true and the false.” In other words, philosophy is that 
                                                 
5 Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works 
of Michel Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 1 (London: Penguin, 2000), 87. 
6 Ibid. 
Foucault Studies, No. 21, pp. 22-51 
25 
 
form of thought that seeks to determine “the conditions and limits of the subject’s access to truth.” 
Spirituality, on the other hand, is defined as “the search, practice, and experience through which 
the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the 
truth.” The practices involved in spirituality, Foucault emphasizes, are “not for knowledge but for 
the subject.”7 There is a necessary transformation of the subject’s very being since the subject does 
not have right of access to the truth and is not originally capable of access to the truth. Foucault 
writes: 
The truth is not given to the subject by a simple act of knowledge (connaissance), which would 
be founded and justified simply by the fact that he is the subject and because he possesses this 
or that structure of subjectivity … for the subject to have right of access to the truth he must be 
changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, other than 
himself. The truth is only given to the subject at a price that brings the subject’s being into play. 
For as he is, the subject is not capable of truth.8  
In other words, if spirituality is still a question of knowing oneself, such knowledge is 
subordinated to practices that “take care of the self” in such a way that the subject becomes 
capable of accessing truth. 
 
The Platonic “covering up” of care of the self 
The “simplest but most fundamental formula by which spirituality can be defined” is, for 
Foucault, that “there can be no truth without a conversion or transformation of the subject.”9 This 
notion of conversion is “one of the most important technologies of the self the West has known”10 
and is central to the practice of care of the self. Care of the self [epimeleia heautou], Foucault goes to 
great lengths to show, originated in Greek culture but appears throughout the history of the West. 
Its first theoretical emergence, he argues, is in Plato, and “only the Alcibiades11 gives its complete 
theory.”12 For Plato, conversion takes the form of epistrophē, which can be thought of as a return to 
the self or a recollection that returns the soul to its source, the movement by which the soul places 
itself back once again in the eternal. Homoiosis, as “resemblance” or mirroring within oneself of 
the perfection of being through self-knowledge, can be understood as the source and the end of 
the Platonic conversion, and inasmuch as this conversion is functionally dependent on homoiosis, 
Foucault identifies “the specifically Platonic ‘covering up’ of the epimeleia heautou by the gnothi 
seauton (of care of the self by knowledge of the self).”13 Ultimately, for Plato, “take care of yourself” 
                                                 
7 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 15. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 208. 
11 Foucault writes: “what interests me and what I find quite fascinating in this dialogue, is that basically we find 
here in outline an entire account of Plato’s philosophy, from Socratic questioning to what appear to be elements 
quite close to the final Plato or even to Neo-Platonists” (Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 74). 
12 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 66. 
13 Ibid., 419. 
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always implies “know yourself.”  
 Foucault’s analysis of the Alcibiades begins with the way in which the problem of 
ignorance is uncovered through Socratic questioning. Alcibiades’ situation is a political one, and 
his primary concern in the dialogue is entering Athenian public life. Upon entry into public life, 
Socrates insists, Alcibiades will have to confront many rivals: internal rivals, since he is not the 
only one who wants to govern, and external rivals or the city’s enemies. In relation to both, 
Alcibiades is inferior. He has neither the education nor the wealth of his adversaries. Since he 
cannot compensate for these defects, Socrates suggests that the only thing that would enable 
Alcibiades to confront his rivals is “a know-how [savoir], a tekhnē.”14 If he has knowledge that 
would enable him to govern the city well, this would at least put him on equal footing with his 
rivals. At this point, Socrates asks what it is to govern the city well, and Alcibiades replies that the 
city is well governed when harmony reigns among its citizens. However, when asked about the 
nature of this harmony, Alcibiades remains silent and despairs. Socrates reassures him not to 
worry, since at his early age it is not too late to remedy the situation by taking care of himself, and 
find his place within public life. Foucault notes how, at this point in the dialogue, the need to be 
concerned with oneself is linked to the exercise of power:  
 
you can see that ‘taking care of oneself’ is entailed by and inferred from the individual’s will to 
exercise political power over others. One cannot govern others, one cannot govern others well, 
one cannot transform one’s privileges into political action on others, into rational action, if one 
is not concerned about oneself.15  
 
Alcibiades seems to know that the purpose of his political activity consists in the well-being of the 
city’s citizens, their mutual harmony, but he still does not know how to take care of the city. But 
since he does not yet know what harmony is nor is he even aware of his own ignorance, he must 
attend to himself.16 As a result, there is a need to take care of oneself insofar as one must govern 
others.17 
 In placing ignorance at the core of Alcibiades’ silence, the care of the self that Socrates 
recommends is really an appeal to self-knowledge: to care for the self is to know oneself. The 
paradigm of self-knowledge, which is echoed in Plato’s other dialogues, is provided by the well-
known and often employed metaphor of the eye. The self does not equal one’s possession of a 
body, Socrates shows, but is equated with the soul, and so to know yourself means to know your 
soul. If one wants to know how the soul can know itself, one takes the example of the eye. The eye 
can only see itself when it sees the image of itself sent back to it by a reflective surface. Another 
eye, Socrates suggests, provides the best mirror in which an eye might see itself, since in this case 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 35. 
15 Ibid., 36. 
16 Note that this is the inverse of the scheme found in The Republic (cf. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 
54). 
17 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 44. 
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the eye does not only see itself in the other eye, it sees itself in the source of vision, in “the 
excellence of the eye.” The act of vision that allows the eye to see itself can only be carried out in 
another act of vision, found in the other’s eye. In the same way, Socrates argues, the soul will only 
see itself by focusing its gaze on an element having the same nature as itself, by fixing its gaze on 
that which is the very source of the soul’s nature, the soul’s excellence, which is thought and 
knowledge [to phronein, to eidenai]. That part of the soul that ensures thought and knowledge is 
the divine element, and by turning towards the divine the soul will be able to grasp itself. To truly 
see oneself one must look at the divine element in oneself and, in this way, knowledge of the 
divine is the condition of knowledge of the self. 
 Socrates tells Alcibiades: 
Just as true mirrors are clearer, purer and brighter than the mirror of the eye, so God (ho theos) is 
purer and brighter than the best part of our soul … It is God, then, that we must look at: for 
whoever wishes to judge the quality of the soul, he is the best mirror of human things 
themselves, we can best see and know ourselves in him.18  
Making contact with the divine in this way endows the soul with wisdom [sōphrosunē], insofar as 
it comes to know the divine as the source of thought and knowledge, after which it will be able to 
turn back towards the world. Thus endowed, the soul will be capable of distinguishing good from 
evil, the true from the false. As in The Republic, the divine is the ultimate source of justice 
[dikaiosunē], and there are thus political consequences. According to Socrates, only those who 
ascend to comprehension of justice through contact with the divine are fit to rule the state. 
Concerning itself with justice, after having made the movement of ascent and descent, the soul is 
able to conduct itself properly and will be able to govern the city. Foucault summarizes:  
Consequently, taking care of oneself and being concerned with justice amount to the same thing, 
and the dialogue’s game – starting from the question “how do I become a good governor?” – 
consists in leading Alcibiades to the precept “take care of yourself” and, by developing what 
this precept must be, what meaning it must be given, we discover that “taking care of oneself” 
is to care about justice.19 
Foucault establishes what he calls “the Platonic model of conversion” around three essential 
points. Alcibiades does not know he is ignorant in relation to his rivals, but comes to discover his 
ignorance under the guidance of Socrates. Further, because Alcibiades discovers that he was 
unaware of his ignorance, he finds that he must attend to himself in order to put an end to his 
ignorance. So the first point is that “ignorance and the discovery of being aware of this ignorance 
[…] gives rise to the requirement of caring for the self.”20 Alcibiades and Socrates thus agree on 
the importance of the Delphic maxim “know thyself.” The undertaking of caring for the self is 
understood as consisting in knowing oneself, and this leads to Foucault’s second point: “The 
entire surface of the care of the self is occupied by this requirement of self-knowledge which […] 
                                                 
18 Alcibiades 133c, quoted in Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 70. 
19 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 72. 
20 Ibid., 254. 
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takes the form of the soul’s grasp of its own being.”21 This leads directly to the third point, which 
is that in the Platonic model, this grasping of one’s own being occurs through a process of seeing, 
of recognizing the divine and intelligible in one’s own self (i.e., homoiosis). In this way, Foucault 
argues that Platonic recollection is situated precisely where care of the self and self-knowledge 
meet. Their intersection can be thought of in the form of a circuit: by recalling what it has seen the 
soul discovers what it is, and by thus recalling what it is the soul gains access to the truth of what 
it has seen. So while Foucault views Plato’s philosophy as the site of the emergence of the notion 
of care of the self, this notion is entirely “philosophical” insofar as “Plato brings the whole of the 
care of the self back to the form of knowledge and self-knowledge.”22 Homoiosis in the Alcibiades 
“founds dikaiosunē with a kind of unproblematic self-evidence,” 23  since endowed with self-
knowledge, the soul is able to conduct itself properly, and being able to conduct itself properly it 
is able to govern the city. 
 In sum, the Alcibiades can be viewed as outlining the first complete theory of care of the 
self as it has come to be understood in the West: subordinated to the prescription of self-
knowledge. Furthermore, this self-knowledge is based on having access to what is innate to the 
self: the self comes to know itself and in the movement of conversion, by which it knows itself, it 
recognizes something that it always already knew. As Foucault puts it, in the Platonic model, the 
truth that results from self-knowledge is “not the truth with regard to which the soul would be an 
object to be known, but a truth which is the truth the soul knew.”24 The relation between the 
reflexivity of the self on the self and the knowledge of the truth is established in the form of the 
already-there, and self-knowledge is arrived at in the element of identity. If conversion is to be 
understood as a certain way of constituting the subject of true knowledge as the subject of right 
action, which is why the convergence of the philosophical and the political in the Alcibiades is so 
significant, this takes place entirely on the side of the subject, in a kind of withdrawal from the 
world that puts the subject in contact with its inherent and essential goodness, and in this way 
offers a principle of ethical transcendence.  
 
From care of the self to self-government 
Foucault’s interest in the relation between care of the self and self-knowledge can be seen as a 
part of a broader project of developing a genealogy of power relations, particularly under the 
thematic of the government of self and others, which dominates his ethical writings in the 1980s. 
In 1982 Foucault noted that in the past he had, perhaps, insisted too much on technologies of 
domination and power, and that he was more and more interested in the interaction between 
oneself and others, “and in the technologies of individual domination, in the mode of action that 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 255. 
22 Ibid., 49. 
23 Ibid., 73. 
24 Ibid., 455. 
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an individual exercises upon himself by means of the technologies of the self.”25 The encounter 
between technologies of domination and those of the self is what Foucault calls “governmentality,” 
a term introduced in his 1977-78 lectures, entitled Security, Territory, Population. Foucault’s use of 
the term governmentality in these lectures pertains primarily to an analysis of the development of 
“pastoral power” from the tenth to the seventeenth century, which concerned itself with the 
conduct of souls. To be sure, Foucault’s analysis of the Alcibiades can be understood as 
emphasizing the role of pastoral power, raising the question: “Can the city’s decision-maker, can 
the commander, be defined as a sort of shepherd?”26 In this sense, the Alcibiades takes as its object 
the conduct of others. Yet in another, and perhaps stronger sense, it takes as its object the conduct 
of oneself. It is this doubling of the role of conduct in the Alcibiades that makes it so interesting for 
Foucault.  
 Foucault emphasizes that conduct, in the sense that he wants to problematize it, always 
has this double dimension: 
Conduct is the activity of conducting [conduire], of conduction [la conduction] if you like, but it is 
equally the way in which one conducts oneself [se conduit], lets oneself be conducted [se laisse 
conduire], is conducted [est conduit], and finally, in which one behaves [se comporter] as an effect 
of a form of conduct [une conduit] as the action of conducting or of conduction [conduction].27 
Foucault suggests that this equivocal nature of conduct is one of the best aids for coming to terms 
with the specificity of power relations. If to conduct is at the same time to lead others and a way 
of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities, the exercise of power is a “conduct of 
conducts” and a “management of possibilities.” The term “government,” Foucault insists, “must 
be allowed the very broad meaning it had in the sixteenth century.” Government, at that time, did 
not simply refer to political structures or to the management of states, but designated  
the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed […] [and] covered 
not only the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection but also modes of 
action, more or less considered and calculated, that were destined to act upon the possibilities 
of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of 
others.28 
Yet, as Arnold Davidson has pointed out, Foucault moves quickly from the specific form of 
power that takes the conduct of individuals as its object to the correlative movements of counter-
                                                 
25 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential 
Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 1 (London: Penguin, 2000), 225. 
26 Michel Foucault, “‘Omnes et Singulatim’: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,” in James D. Faubion (ed.), and 
Robert Hurley (trans.) Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 3 (New York: The New Press, 2001), 
305. This comment is actually a reference to Plato’s The Statesman, but it also applies to the Alcibiades. 
27 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78, edited by Michel 
Senellart, and translated by Graham Burchell (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
258. 
28 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in James D. Faubion (ed.), and Robert Hurley (trans.), Power: 
Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 3 (New York: The New Press, 2001), 341. 
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conduct. What’s more, the forms that resistance to power as conducting takes, like conduct itself, 
have a double dimension: “They are movements characterized by wanting to be conducted 
differently, whose objective is a different type of conduction, and that also attempt to indicate an 
area in which each individual can conduct himself, the domain of one’s own conduct or 
behavior.” 29  Counter-conduct, then, is the struggle against the procedures and institutions 
implemented for conducting, from within conduct itself. Power, for Foucault, is a set of actions on 
possible actions, a way of acting on subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of acting. 
Power is exercised only over “free” subjects, that is, subjects who are faced with a field of 
possibilities in which several forms of conduct are available.30 However, as Davidson points out, 
the “autonomous sphere of conduct” has become more or less invisible to modern moral and 
political philosophy. This is a result of a “juridification” or “codification” of moral and political 
experience, resulting from the subordination of the role of conduct to law.31  
 Much of Foucault’s ethical work is dedicated to rendering the autonomous sphere of 
conduct visible by demonstrating that there have been a number of different ways of “conducting 
oneself” throughout history. Conducting oneself, in these various forms, centered on the problem 
of how someone is able to become an ethical subject, that is, how someone is able to be both the 
subject of truth and subject of right action. In other words, how far do the truths one knows really 
provide the forms of action in one’s conduct throughout life? Care of the self in the Platonic 
model, Foucault has shown, was subordinated to the self-evident truth of one’s divine nature, and 
conducting oneself merely meant remembering what one always was. The “juridification” of 
conduct results in something very similar, whereby the subject refers its action to the truth of a 
code of law, given in the self-evidence of tradition. Neither the Platonic model nor the juridical 
model require any real transformation of the self in its effort to become capable of truth. The 
subject need only develop a knowledge that is waiting for it in advance, the knowledge of what it 
is truly meant to be, in order that it conduct itself rightly. 
 Significantly, Foucault introduces Hellenic philosophy, or what he calls the “Hellenistic 
model,” as an alternative to both the Platonic model and the juridical model. Central to the 
Hellenistic model is the role of the Socratic principle of askesis, which “should be understood as a 
training of the self by oneself.”32 Askesis develops self-knowledge in the effort to link a subject’s 
actions to the truth, as the acquisition of virtue. Yet such knowledge is not merely theoretical 
knowledge [epistemē thēorētikē], but also involves practical knowledge [epistemē praktikē], and the 
latter can only be acquired through painstaking [philotomōs, philoponōs] training.33 One cannot 
simply refer one’s actions to an external standard, to a truth that does not affect the subject but 
                                                 
29 Arnold Davidson, “In Praise of Counter-Conduct,” History of the Human Sciences 24, no. 4 (2011), 27. 
30 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 341-2.  
31 Davidson, “In Praise of Counter-Conduct,” 31; Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, 
Volume 2 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 30. 
32 Michel Foucault, “Self Writing,” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 1 (London: Penguin, 2000), 208. 
33 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 316. 
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merely requires that the subject know its place. Foucault makes it clear that “moral conceptions in 
Greek and Greco-Roman antiquity were much more oriented towards practices of the self and the 
question of askesis than toward codifications of conducts and the strict definition of what is 
permitted and what is forbidden.”34 
 Significantly, despite the focus on pastoral power in the 1977-78 lectures, Foucault sees “a 
development of forms of the activity of conducting men outside of ecclesiastical authority,” which 
he specifies as “a whole series of aspects that form a wide range, starting from the development of 
specifically private forms of the problem of conduction.” This is linked, he suggests, to “the 
appearance, or rather reappearance, of the function that philosophy had in, let’s say, the 
Hellenistic period, and which had effectively disappeared in the Middle Ages, that is to say 
philosophy as the answer to the fundamental question of how to conduct oneself.”35 The sixteenth 
century was a time of “intensification, increase, and general proliferation of this question and of 
these techniques of conduct,” and with the sixteenth century “we enter the age of forms of 
conducting, directing, and government.”36 The general problem of “government,” according to 
Foucault, emerges in the sixteenth century, though with respect to different problems and in 
different aspects. Nevertheless, true to the dual nature of conduct, two problems stand out. On 
the one hand, there was the problem of governing others, “which was, of course, the problem of 
Catholic or Protestant pastoral doctrine,” and on the other hand there was the problem of the 
government of oneself associated with “[t]he sixteenth century return to Stoicism.”37  
 In the what follows it will be shown that the two are in fact inextricably linked. In Jean 
Gerson’s critique of the Catholic church (a central moment of pastoral counter-conduct) and his 
emphasis on conformity to divine law through a subjective power to act rightly, a departure from 
reliance on external standards of conduct can be observed. However, the association of this power 
with dominion will lead in later natural law theory to its legalization. With Grotius, the 
justification of imperialism through the application of this same power to appropriate will 
provide the conceptual conditions that make possible the effort to secure the conduct of all that 
Foucault calls “governmentality.” 
 
Natural rights and the problem of appropriation 
Foucault famously opposed the pastorate to ethico-political spiritualities, but he also identified a 
number of “insurrections of conduct” internal to Christianity itself. Within these insurrections, 
individual conduct in relation to the community of the Church is specifically and deliberately 
problematized through the natural law concept of dominion. Central to these local and practical 
experiments in conduct are questions of self-preservation. Yet what begins as a practical 
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problematic of individuals’ power to conduct themselves is progressively reoriented to theoretical 
questions of the objects of conduct. As the notion of the right to appropriate the means to self-
preservation increasingly takes central place, dominion is gradually reduced to a legal power of 
preserving property. This is the “juridification of conduct”: through a shift to conformity to law as 
the common measure of the power of individuals to preserve themselves, the power discovered 
in pastoral experiments in (counter-)conduct becomes the very means through which conduct is 
regulated. The power inherent in dominion, it might be said, becomes located in property law 
rather than in individuals, as it becomes the means of securing peoples’ conduct in relation to a 
world of possessions.  
 
Gerson 
The thought of Jean Gerson should be considered an insurrection of conduct internal to 
Christianity, as he was part of that movement of reform within the Catholic church called 
conciliarism, and drew upon earlier juristic thought to assert the authority of the church as it was 
invested in the Christian community, conceived as a corporate entity. This was significant in the 
wake of the Great Schism of 1378, insofar as conciliarists argued that a general council 
representing the universal church was of greater authority than any single pope. Gerson argued 
that Bishops held certain rights by reason of the status of their diocese, a ius episcopale that 
included a right of preaching, a right of hearing confession, a right of giving burial, and a right of 
administering sacraments, independent of Roman privilege. However, he also argued for the 
rights of each individual member of the clergy, declaring that parish priests were originally 
instituted by Christ and thereby held rights associated with their office. These were individual 
rights in the sense that an individual could sue for them, though they were not strictly private 
rights, but were rights held by individuals as members of a corporate community.38 For Gerson, 
the power inherent in corporate membership was the condition for the universality of potestas 
ecclesiastica. 
 Gerson was guided by his aim of church reform, but he was also anxious to avoid what he 
saw as the errors of other reformists, particularly those of Richard FitzRalph and John Wyclif. 
FitzRalph had held that all dominion, that is rulership or ownership, was founded in divine grace, 
or in other words, that only those who enjoyed God’s grace could exercise licit authority on earth. 
Wyclif, taking this conclusion to antinomian extremes, argued that since church authority was 
obviously corrupt, they forfeited all their rights as prelates and could exercise no licit dominion 
over the church or its property. For Gerson, such a path could only leave the church in ruins since 
there was no certainty surrounding the status of any individual soul before God other than 
through worldly actions. Without some way of deciding whether church prelates justly held 
dominion, there could be no authority in the church whatever. However, this led to the greater 
problem of whether there was a sure way of knowing the status of any individual soul before 
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God. Gerson notes the importance of understanding “evalengelical dominion” and “human 
dominion,” but the concept of “natural dominion” was the most important for his theory of right. 
 While the conciliarists aimed at church reform, in the absence of such reform the question 
of how the individual soul might reform itself was paramount. Gerson rejected the idea that a 
person could receive saving grace through their efforts alone, condemning this view, alongside 
many other medieval theologians, as Pelagian heresy. According to this doctrine, by the strength 
of their will, a person might dispose their soul toward the spiritual life by striving to obey God’s 
law.39 And yet, if “conformity” to divine law was the condition of righteous moral conduct, the 
problem was how this law could be accessed as it became increasingly obscured by human 
convention. Looking to obey the pure law of God, Christian nevertheless found themselves 
bound on pain of sin by a vast accumulation of additional local regulations.40 And yet Gerson 
wrote: “No one of us is such a sinner as to have no dominion that can be called natural,” since 
“[n]atural dominion is a gift of God by which a creature has the right [ius] immediately from God 
to take inferior things for his use and preservation.”41 If right reason inheres essentially in God 
and all creatures have being and goodness from God, all creatures could be said to enjoy a certain 
right [ius] by virtue of their participation in the gift of divine reason. Gerson famously wrote: “Ius 
is an immediate faculty or power pertaining to anyone according to right reason.”42 Ultimately, 
this definition would allow Gerson to argue that every parish had a natural right to preserve itself 
in being just like and individual person, but it also had more far-reaching ramifications. Gerson 
will allow that “every positive being has as much right thus generally defined as it has of being, 
and thus of goodness.” In this sense even “the sky has a right to rain, the sun to shine, fire to 
warm, the swallow to build its nest.”43 This potentially allows all creatures, both rational and 
irrational, moral goodness of action by way of “conformity,” though it is only human reason in its 
highest form [synderesis] that could discern universal principles of good, and, from these, derive 
more particular rules of conduct. Thus, humans could live in conformity with God’s law by 
exercising an innate ius, a faculty or power in accordance with their natural reason. 
 
Summenhart 
Annabel Brett considers fifteenth century theologian Conrad Summenhart to mark “the high 
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point of literature which equates dominium and ius,” and in this sense the late medieval 
philosopher of rights and liberties par excellence.44 Summenhart agreed with Gerson’s definitions 
of ius, as a proximate power or faculty of individuals according to the dictates of right reason, and 
dominium, as a proximate power or faculty of appropriating things for licit use. However, he also 
makes a distinction that is not found in Gerson, stating that ius can be taken in two ways: in one 
sense it is the same as law [lex], “as when we say that the precepts of God are divine law [ius 
divinum] and that statutes of emperors are civil law [ius civile],” and in another sense it is taken to 
be the same as a power, “as when we say a father has a right as regards his son or a king as 
regards his subjects, and men have a right over their things and possessions and sometimes also 
over persons as in the case of slaves […].”45 In the second sense, right is a power insofar as it is 
over or towards things or other persons in possession of things. In other words, Summenhart 
takes Gerson’s description of right as a power to imply that right is in an important sense a 
relation, that is, “a habitual condition with respect to something: founded in him who is said to 
have right, and terminating in the thing over which or in which he has right (as the remote 
terminus), and in the action which he is able to perform upon or concerning that thing (as the 
proximate terminus).”46  
 Referring to Aristotle’s De Anima, Summenhart notes that there are two ways to conceive 
of power; as the material reality of the soul that brings forth actions, and in this sense absolute 
insofar as it is a relation only to its own actions; or as the formal reality of a signified object 
insofar as it disposes the soul to actions relative to that object. In the second sense, power is a 
relation to some external reality, and this, Summenhart argued, was how Gerson was to be 
understood. Brett suggests that Summenhart is deriving his argument from John of Jandun, since 
“nowhere else do we find the concept of relation applied to potencies.”47 However, John of 
Jandun only allowed for a definition of potency as a relation to an act, whereas Summenhart, by 
introducing a difference between proximate and remote termini within a relation, converts the 
relationship of potency to act to a relationship of potency to object. Moreover, since both right and 
dominion are formally relations to objects, the potency in question is the same for both. As 
Tierney puts it, “Summenhart thus understood a right as a power that gave rise to a relationship 
between a person and the object of the right […] a right was a disposition of the right-holder in 
relation to something, that could be expressed only by some action regarding it.”48  
 Whereas Gerson had argued that every creature has as much right as it has being, by 
assimilating dominium to Gerson’s notion of power Summenhart is allowing that it be understood 
as “a neutral quality which can be predicated of all created beings in so far as they are capable of 
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any kind of action which affects other creatures.”49 Dominion, in this sense, is as much a category 
of natural science as it is of civic agency. That dominium is predicable of all creatures raises the 
question of whether there was a time when creation had not yet appropriated the various dominia, 
that is, a time where dominia were not yet distinguished. Summenhart posits a very broad range 
of dominia, including twenty-three subdivisions to account for the entire range of creation, from 
inanimate bodies through to irrational animals. However, the dominion that pertains to rational 
creatures is something different, since, as Gerson pointed out, only in humans did ius designate a 
liberty, a freedom of action in relation to the objects of their rights. Ultimately, Summenhart 
adopts the Roman law definition of liberty entailing a dominion of the human over itself, “for if 
he is free, he has the faculty of doing whatever he likes, unless prohibited by force or right.”50 So, 
while there may have been a time when the dominia of inanimates and irrationals were indistinct, 
“civil dominia understood as involving appropriation […] were never indistinct; because it was 
never the case that someone had civil dominium of a thing of which everyone else had dominium 
[…] because this involves contradiction.”51 In other words, human dominia involve liberty to 
appropriate, and civil polity is completely coincident with distinct dominia, civil law being 
nothing but the law determining the appropriation of dominia.52 While dominium is originally 
governed by natural law, applying to all of creation, for humans who appropriate via their 
freedom, dominium must be protected by civil law. Civil law protects the dominion of humans 
over themselves by protecting the things which they appropriate from the appropriation of others, 
and it is in this sense that their natural power to appropriate is held to be a right. 
 
Vitoria 
The Spanish theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria thought that while Gerson and 
Summenhart had made significant advances in moral and legal theory by equating ius and 
dominium, their naturalization of dominion was nevertheless flawed. Vitoria thought that to apply 
ius and dominium to both irrationals and rationals perpetuated a confusion. Following Aquinas, 
Vitoria believed that only a rational nature bestowed personhood, and therefore the right to self-
government. By virtue of their intellect and will, persons are masters of their own actions, and it 
is only such a relationship to action, a dominion of self, that implies a right. Dominium, Vitoria 
says, can be defined in three ways. In a first sense, dominium is defined “strictly and peculiarly, so 
that it signifies a certain eminence and superiority, the same way that princes are called domini.”53 
Summenhart made the same distinction between strict and general senses of dominium, but 
Vitoria points out that in the strict sense it is not a right since right must be thought in broader 
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terms. Secondly, dominium is defined “more widely” in a legal sense as property, but this is still 
not equivalent to right. Rights are held by those creatures who are capable of receiving injury, but 
restitution is not only due in the case of goods taken from a proprietor. Dominion, as a right is 
“the faculty of using an object as one personally sees fit.”54 As a result, Vitoria posits a third sense 
of dominium, which addresses the will of the dominus as that which determines a right to 
something, beyond superiority or ownership. Aquinas had maintained that every person was 
dominus of their own acts, “they have dominion of their actions through free choice,”55 and 
“through this man is owner of other things.”56 To the contrary, irrationals act by necessity, and 
since animals lack the freedom to control their actions, juridically speaking, they could not suffer 
injury [inuria]. In this sense irrationals could not experience injustice; they could not suffer a 
wrong and therefore could not have a right. What is more, they could not have dominion, since 
“[t]here is no dominion that is not founded in a right.”57  
 Yet Aquinas also wrote, “law […] is the ground of right.”58 Crucially, Vitoria reinterprets 
what was an objective definition along the lines of subjective right: “[Aquinas] says therefore that 
right is that which is licit in accordance with the laws. And so we use the word when we speak. 
For we say, “I have not the right of doing this, that is, it is not licit for me; or again, ‘I use my 
right,’ that is, it is licit.”59 As Tierney shows, Vitoria is treating a right as a kind of license to act 
within the framework of law, and was in this way relying on a concept of permissive law: “for 
Vitoria permissive law defined an area of free choice where a person was not commanded or 
forbidden to act in a certain way but could say, ‘I use my right’.”60 Furthermore, Vitoria adapts 
Aquinas’ argument to a Gersonian theory of power, stating that “ius is a power or faculty 
pertaining to anyone in accordance with the law.”61 Tierney suggests that this is merely a slight 
misquotation of Summenhart who, following Gerson, wrote of a power or faculty “in accordance 
with right reason” or “in according with primal justice.”62 However, this slight change in the 
thought of power has significant ramifications, since we are now to understand the fundamental 
right of humanity through its freedom, not as a power according to right reason, but rather as 
power in accordance with law since “[w]hoever has a faculty in accordance with the laws has a 
right.”63 
 Since Aristotle, and according to Christian doctrine, it had become commonplace to state 
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that lesser creatures existed for the sake of more perfect ones, and insofar as the human was the 
most perfect it had “right and dominion” over all. Vitoria gave a natural law argument in support 
of this, stating that “it is according to natural law that man conserves himself in being […]. But 
this can not be without the other creatures, therefore, it has the right to use them all.”64 Moreover, 
“dominion of things did not belong only to the human race as community; rather each individual 
person was owner of everything, so that he could use or abuse it at will.”65 The obvious question 
follows: how was everything divided such that private property had emerged from this state of 
total use? Following Gratian, Vitoria asserts that division is a result of human law. But since 
natural law makes every individual an owner of everything, the institution of private property 
would deprive a person of their natural right. However, Vitoria notes, this would not be the case 
if the natural law ordaining the community of property “was not a precept binding for all time 
but only a kind of permissive law.”66 What Vitoria is suggesting, is that the proper use of a 
person’s right to claim property constitutes the law. Moreover, it is a principle of natural law, says 
Vitoria, that an original division should meet with the agreement of all people [in consilio], that is, 
given the question of how the division was to be made, the will of the majority should prevail. 
Significantly, this need not be formal consent, but only virtual consent [consensu virtuali], “so that 
when one person began to cultivate a piece of land others would tacitly recognize his claim to it,” 
or as Vitoria put it, it is consent expressed “by deeds rather than by words.”67 This is how the ius 
gentium [law of nations] was formed. The nations of the world did not need to meet together to 
consent explicitly to its principles, since they derive from the natural application of human rights. 
In other words, as the rational division of property, licit use of power outlines the contours of a 
law that expresses the will of the people. 
 
Grotius 
Like Vitoria, Hugo Grotius agreed with Cicero that “by nature nothing is private,” and even 
states that this is the “first law of nations.”68 Grotius notes that in his time, the term dominium 
connotes possession of something proprium, and refers to exclusive ownership, while the word 
commune means ownership by a group. The same terms, he writes, applied to the primordial 
condition of humanity when no private property existed. The word commune, at that “early age” 
was nothing but an antonym of proprium, and dominium denoted the power of not unjustly using 
something common. Dominium, in this early sense, was use “of fact” and not by law. Moreover, 
according to the original grant of the world to humanity, everyone could take possession of what 
they needed, and “to have made use of Things that were then in common, and to have consumed 
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them, as far as Nature required, had been the Right of the first Possessor.”69 Such a right of 
possession followed, Grotius thought, from the fact that consumables such as “food and drink” 
diminished through use, and as a result the limit of a possessor’s needs would entail making 
these consumables unavailable to others. In other words, the thing used becomes “part of the very 
substance of the user,”70 leading to exclusive possession. Grotius borrowed from the decretals of 
Pope John XXII, Ad conditorem and Quia quorundum, where the thesis was advanced that this form 
of use was inseparable from ownership. Exercising one’s right to possession, in relation to the 
necessities of survival and the pursuit of self-interest, involved a correlative duty to abstain from 
exercising this right in regards to the possessions of others.  
 Grotius then argued that, by a logical process, ownership was extended from things that 
are consumed in use to things, such as clothes and other movables, which are not entirely 
consumed in use but by use become less fit for future use. Further, because of this development, it 
was inevitable that not even “all immovable things—to wit, fields—could not remain 
undivided,” 71  since, even if land itself is not consumed, it is nevertheless bound up with 
subsequent consumption, as for example arable lands are used to produce food, and there is not 
enough land for indiscriminate use by everyone. Recognition of the ultimate inseparability of use 
and prioprietas led to the establishment of law imitating nature, and decreeing that ownership is 
acquired through occupation. In the ‘Prolegomena’ to De iure praedae, Grotius advances the 
precept of the law of nature defining “private occupation”: 
It shall be permissible to acquire for oneself, and to retain, those things which are useful for life. The 
latter precept, indeed, we shall interpret with Cicero as an admission that each individual may, 
without violating the precepts of nature, prefer to see acquired for himself rather than for 
another, that which is important for the conduct of life … However, since God bestowed these 
gifts upon the human race, not upon individual men, and since such gifts could be turned to 
use only through acquisition of possession by individuals, it necessarily followed that τὸ 
ἐσφετερισμένον, “what had been seized as his own” by each person should become the 
property of that person. Such seizure is called possessio [the act of taking possession], the 
forerunner of usus [use], and subsequently of dominium [ownership].72  
And from this arises the precept, “[l]et no one seize possession of that which has been taken into the 
possession of another.”73 In De jure belli Grotius clarifies that the introduction of private property is 
not the result of “a mere act of will” since “one could not know what things another wished to 
have, in order to abstain from them—and besides, several might desire the same thing.” Private 
property, then, arises from the recognition of the inseparability of use and ownership, from “a 
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certain Compact and Agreement, either expressly, as by a Division; or else tacitly, as by 
Seizure.”74 As in Vitoria, the right of first occupancy appears to lead to consensus. 
 In the final stage of his argument, Grotius states that the open sea cannot be occupied both 
because of its vastness and because it was inherently suited to the common use of all humanity. 
The sea is fundamentally different from the land, incapable of ownership due to the impossibility 
of “corporeal possession.” The sea will always remain common to all of humanity, in a “state of 
nature,” since “neither the people nor any private man can have any property in the sea.”75 
Grotius uses this final argument to mount a defense of Dutch imperialism in the East Indies. At 
the time, the Dutch East India Company was at odds with the Spanish and the Portuguese, who 
had made claims to monopoly of trade and navigation in the Indian Ocean. The dispute, 
according to Grotius, surrounded the question of “whether the huge and vast sea be the addition 
of one kingdom.”76 Straumann notes that Spanish and Portuguese claims to control over the 
Indian Ocean were based on the same legal titles that justified territorial acquisitions in their 
overseas colonies, that is title of papal donation, title of discovery, and title of occupation, which 
for Grotius’ purposes “had to be undermined in favor of an alternative doctrine of sources.”77 
These sources, as Straumann observes, are effectively Roman law as it was re-interpreted by the 
Spanish Thomists (such as Vitoria), based on the connection between the law of nature, deducible 
from right reason, and the law of nations, regard as the “positive” product of human agreement. 
In particular, the way in which Grotius derives norms and their formal origin is “strongly 
reminiscent of the way Cicero treats of ‘nature’ rather than Roman law as a normative repository.” 
For Grotius, acting solely in the pursuit of self-interest is not only morally wrong but also legally 
wrong in the state of nature that, in a Ciceronian tradition, provides for rules with the status of 
valid legal claims.78  
 Cicero is known to have defended Roman imperial conquest, and provided, according to 
Straumann, “what probably is the first extant philosophical justification of the Roman empire,” 
grounded in two concepts: the Stoic notion of natural law, and the Roman notion of just war.79 
Both Straumann80 and Van Ittersum81 have argued convincingly, and against somewhat more 
optimistic reading of Grotius, that his use of Stoic notions went a long way towards a justification 
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of imperialism and colonialism. In particular, the notion of the fellowship of humankind or “that 
world community, commended […] by the Stoics”82 was fundamental to his assertion that war 
against those obstructing Dutch trade in the East Indies does not represent a contradiction of 
natural law. Inasmuch as goods such as the high seas proceeded originally from nature, and were 
produced for common use and remained in that “primeval state” in which things were held in 
common, they belonged to all of humanity. Grotius’ adoption of the ius gentium as derived but 
distinct from natural law allowed him to extend the reach of the norms of private law from the 
realm of humanity in general to the relations between peoples.  
 In order to achieve this he appeals to a notion of subjective right:  
 
Now add the fact that the sea is not only said by the jurists to be common by the law of nations, 
but without any addition it is said to be of the right of nations. In these passages ‘right’ can not 
mean a norm of justice, but a moral power over a thing as when we say ‘this thing is of my right, 
that is, I have ownership over it or use or something similar.’83 
 
Grotius defines a subjective right as “a moral Quality annexed to the Person, enabling him to 
have, or do, something justly,”84 which, as for Gerson, Summenhart, and Vitoria before him, 
meant a power [potestas] over oneself, which orients moral relations with others. Significantly, 
such a right accords with more that just the right “to acquire for oneself and to retain those things 
which are useful for life.” It is also permissibile “to defend one’s own life and to shun that which 
threatens to prove injurious.”85 Extrapolating from the right of self-defense, Grotius argues that 
transgression of natural law merits punishment of two kinds:  
 
The first kind of punishment has as its aim the correction of one individual; the second kind is 
aimed at the correction of all other persons, in addition to that one. The attainment of these two 
objectives leads to a third: universal security. For if all persons conduct themselves aright, it 
necessarily follows that no one will suffer wrongly.86  
 
Grotius follows Seneca, who had argued that the ultimate aim of punishment is “universal 
security,” and argues that transgressors of the natural law (such as the Portuguese) should be 
punished for the sake of the entire human race. By associating the conduct of all with universal 
security Grotius transforms moral duty into an enforceable legal norm. 
 
Cicero and Grotius’ appropriation of appropriation 
The centrality of the notion of self-preservation in Grotius’ thought has been noted by many 
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scholars. Richard Tuck, for example, has argued that self-preservation served as the minimal core 
of Grotius’ conception of moral conduct.87 There is ample evidence to suggest that Grotius took 
the notion of self-preservation from the Stoics, and in particular from Cicero’s discussion of 
oikeiosis in the third book of On Ends. Oikeiosis is a difficult term to translate, but its meaning is 
perhaps best expressed by “appropriation.” Cicero has Cato present the entire system of Stoic 
ethics, starting with an explanation of oikeiosis. An animal’s first impulse, as soon as it is born, 
Cato says, is to take care to preserve itself. An animal “favours its constitution and whatever 
preserves its constitution, whereas it recoils from its destruction and whatever appears to 
promote its destruction.”88 The development of a human being, like other animals, begins with its 
concern for what belongs to it, as it is appropriated and commended to itself. Against the 
Epicurean view, as Annas points out, the Stoics believe that the newly born infant is directed to 
its self-preservation before pleasure affects it in any way; it is directed not towards pleasure, but 
towards its own good, and “to explain the appropriateness of an animal’s or baby’s responses we 
have to assume that the animal or baby is bringing to the situation some conception of the kind of 
thing it is, not merely reacting to particular encounters with pleasure and pain.”89 The objects 
which living beings naturally pursue are those that accord with nature and are good for them, 
such as health, wealth, strength, and other bodily capacities. They are “the primary object of 
desire,” or “the primary objects in accordance with nature.” Whatever accords with nature is 
worthy of selection, which is called an “appropriate action [kathêkon], starting with the 
preservation of oneself within one’s constitution. 
 It is through the use of reason that one learns that certain things are good for them, and 
over time selection becomes stable and continuous. In this way, one begins to see an order or 
“concordance” in the things that one ought to do, “one then values that concordance much more 
highly than those first objects of affection.”90 The growing “consistency” of selection through 
reason soon comes to be praised on its own account, and for the Stoics is thought to be the 
supreme good, since reason is the only good to be sought in virtue of its own power, whereas 
none of the primary objects of nature are sought on their own account, but only insofar as they 
accord with nature. Reason is itself in accordance with nature, and results in what are called 
“right actions” or “rightly performed actions [katorthômata]” which are the measure of virtue 
[honestum]. Moral action, then, is a natural development from the initial appropriate action of self-
preservation [oikeiosis] to the appearance of right reason [recta ratio]. To act morally is to live 
consistently and harmoniously with nature, which is for the Stoics the final aim [telos]. It is not 
that one abandons appropriate actions in favour of right actions, but that one becomes indifferent 
to the primary objects of nature since they form no part of the supreme good, even while 
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maintaining a preference for these things [adiaphora proegmena] over others since they make self-
preservation possible.  
 Up to now Cato has only described what Julia Annas has called “personal oikeiosis,” which 
is an individual’s becoming appropriate to itself, which leads to reason in accordance with nature. 
There is also a process of “social oikeiosis,” which is not a separate process but an extension of the 
first, and which leads to an account of the naturalness of justice. Initially it appears as though any 
account of justice in relation to a natural law that emerges from an initial act of self-preservation 
would quickly be undermined by a criterion of personal advantage. But Cato goes on to describe 
the way in which oikeiosis includes care for others. Starting with the assumption that parent’s care 
for their offspring is natural and instinctual, the Stoics trace the development of human society. 
Just as parents consider their children to be their own, belonging to them, there emerges a natural 
sympathy between human beings insofar as they understand each other to be parts of the same 
community of reason. This can be thought, Cato suggests, in the same way as we think of the 
parts of the human body becoming appropriated by an individual through personal oikeiosis. If 
the power of reason serves an individual in its becoming appropriate to itself and the 
development of morality, how much more can a community of rational agents bring about 
situations when living according to nature is possible. In other words, insofar as humans are 
rational, they think of themselves as parts of a moral community rather than primarily as 
promoters of their own interests. To the extent that the demands of this moral community have 
the kind of force that law has, the Stoics can be thought of expounding a doctrine of “natural law.” 
If what is natural in human beings commends them to other humans through the power of their 
rational faculty, virtuous conduct can be understood as natural. 
 The problems the Dutch were facing in the East Indies and Grotius’ concern with universal 
security and the conduct of all demand an answer to the question of “whether ‘tis ever lawful to 
make war.”91 This question Grotius states, is to be examined through natural law, and he refers to 
Cicero’s argument that “there are two sorts of principals,” some that go before, the first 
impressions relating to the primary objects of nature, and “others that come after, but ought to be 
the Rule of our Actions, preferable to the former [i.e. the first Impressions of Nature].”92 And, like 
Cicero, he derives the second from the first in a more or less continuous fashion, emphasizing the 
naturalness of right reason in humans and their innate capacity for moral action or “propriety.” In 
fact, there is a sense in which Grotius collapses social oikeiosis into personal oikeiosis, seemingly 
suggesting that society itself is among the primary natural objects. He writes: 
Man is indeed an Animal, but one of a very high Order, and that excels all the other Species of 
Animals much more than they differ from one another; as the many Actions proper only to 
Mankind sufficiently demonstrate. Now amongst the Things peculiar to Man, is his Desire of 
Society, that is, a certain Inclination to live with those of his own Kind, not in any Manner 
whatever, but peaceably, and in a Community regulated according to the best of his 
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Understanding; which Disposition the Stoicks [sic] termed Oikeiosis. Therefore the Saying, that 
every Creature is led by Nature to seek its own private Advantage, expressed thus universally, 
must not be granted.93 
This “desire of society,” Grotius suggests, is present from birth, and it is only as adults that 
humans, “being capable of acting in the same Manner with respect to Things that are alike,” 
develop “a Faculty of knowing and acting, according to some general Principles” by means of 
which they might fulfill their desire. More even than Cicero, Grotius derives right action from 
appropriate action, since “sociability” or the “Care of maintaining Society in a Manner 
conformable to the Light of human Understanding,” which satisfies a desire emerging from the 
first impression of nature, is itself  
 
the Fountain of Right, properly so called; to which belongs the Abstaining from that which is 
another’s, and the Restitution of what we have of another’s, or of the Profit we have made by it, 
the Obligation of fulfilling Promises, the Reparation of a Damage done through our own 
Default, and the Merit of Punishment among Men.94 
 
It is with this in mind that Grotius is able to argue for war’s agreement with natural law. When 
the question is raised as to whether war is necessarily repugnant to a reasonable and social nature, 
Grotius replies that among the first impressions of nature there is nothing repugnant to war, “all 
Things rather favour it” since the aim of war, as the preservation of life or the securing things 
useful to life, “is very agreeable to those first Motions of Nature […] since Nature has given to 
every Animal Strength to defend and help itself.”95 As Straumann points out, this view of war “is 
absolutely in line with the criteria for the Stoic kathêkon.”96 However, for the Stoics, actions only 
accord with natural law when they are virtuous. Initially, Grotius has shown that war is 
appropriate since it aids self-preservation, and as merely appropriate action it should be 
irrelevant with respect to virtue. Yet it is also clear that war is justified by any obstruction of the 
satisfaction of an individual’s desire for society, since sociability is the “fountain” of those very 
rights Grotius tells us the impediment of which provides the just causes of war. In Stoic terms, 
war as katorthômata is nothing more than a special case of kathêkonta. In war, sociability 
internalizes a regulatory mechanism that for Vitoria was merely virtual—the guarantor of 
consensus, so to speak. 
The primary object of desire that is sociability, derived from the role that property plays in 
self-preservation, is from the outset the common measure of virtue and the rule of human actions, 
the means and the end of moral conduct. As in Vitoria, to promote one’s own interests is always 
already to promote the interests of others, and the Grotian desire for society, beginning from an 
impulse to self-preservation, is identical to the desire for regulated community. Universal security 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 80-1; italics removed.  
94 Ibid., 86; italics removed. 
95 Ibid., 183. 
96 Straumann, “Oikeiosis and Appetitus Societatis,” 63. 
Depew: Foucault Among the Stoics 
44 
 
is in this sense the highest virtue, derived from a rationality that is indistinguishable from the 
distribution of the social as moral and legal conduct. Individual power, inseparable from 
communal rights as it was conceived by Gerson, becomes with Grotius the power of subjects to 
guarantee the regularity and maintenance of society, realized in war. Ultimately, to protect the 
universal desire of society, is to govern the right to property by regulating the “Care of 
maintaining Society,” which according to Grotius, is inseparable from individuals’ care for 
themselves. What is apparent is that the right, which for Gerson had connected individual power 
with a form of counter-conduct, becomes for Grotius a justification for war in order that this same 
right be guaranteed through the regulation of the conduct of all. In other words, Grotius leaves us 
with a principle of ethical transcendence: to take one’s proper place in society is to mirror the 
desire of every other subject. 
 
Oikeiosis in the early Stoics 
Grotius’ use of Stoic oikeiosis relies on Cicero’s account, but the account of the early Stoics was 
somewhat different. As Paul Vander Waerdt has shown, the formula that law is right reason as 
applied to conduct is understood quite different by the Stoics than it was by the later natural law 
tradition. He argues that the Stoics deny that natural law can be summed up in a code of moral 
rules, as for example is offered by Aquinas’ elaborate code of precepts based upon God’s eternal 
law or Grotius’ general principles. To understand the way in which right reason applies to 
conduct for the Stoics, then, we must resist the idea that they adhered to a rule-following model 
of natural law, where moral conduct is prescribed by a specific set of rules corresponding to the 
natural hierarchy of human impulses. Chrysippus, for instance, recognizes the particular class of 
actions which accord with nature, the perfectly virtuous actions or katorthômata performed 
according to right reason by the Stoic sage, who by definition was the only human capable of 
performing them, as opposed to merely appropriate actions or kathêkonta performed by ordinary 
moral progressors. Nature, it is thought, prescribes katorthômata alone, while it proscribes all 
action that falls short of the standard of the sage’s rational activity. However, this does not mean 
that such actions admit of codification. They are not a distinct class of action because they admit 
of a different external description but only as a result of a difference in motivation, and the 
kathêkonta of ordinary agents become katorthômata when performed by the sage, “whose perfectly 
rational and consistent disposition guarantees the moral infallibility of all his actions.”97 Natural 
law is isomorphic with the sage’s right reason, which is not constituted by normative rules with 
substantive content, but by the sage’s intentions emerging from their rational disposition with 
regard to certain situations. Katorthômata are “entirely circumstance dependent” which is 
evidenced by the fact that certain circumstances “may require justified exception to kathêkonta,” 
such that no final set of moral rules can guide performance in every circumstance. What’s 
important to keep in mind here, is that such an exception is never justified by content external to 
                                                 
97 Paul A. Vander Waerdt, “Zeno’s Republic and the Origins of Natural Law,” in Paul A. Vander Waerdt (ed.), 
The Socratic Movement (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 275. 
Foucault Studies, No. 21, pp. 22-51 
45 
 
the very situations that the sages themselves in. As Vander Waerdt argues, the early Stoics held 
“a dispositional rather than a rule following model of natural law, and a correspondingly 
different account of the content of the moral conduct prescribed by it.” Natural law, then, does 
not prescribe determinate actions but a certain rational disposition with which one is to act, which 
is to say, “the perfectly rational and consistent disposition which enables the sage to apprehend 
and act in accordance with the provident order of nature.”98 
 If the early Stoic usage of natural law has these implications, it also leads to a vision of 
justice, which in typical Stoic fashion is one that advocates a universal world-state or cosmopolis. 
Plutarch, in his well-known account of Zeno’s Republic, writes: 
The much-admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, is aimed at this one main 
point, that we should not dwell in cities or peoples, each one marked out by its own principles 
of justice, but we should regard all human beings as our fellow members of the populace and 
fellow-citizens, and there should be one way of life and order; like that of a herd grazing 
together and nurtured by a common law [koinos nomos]. Zeno wrote this, picturing as it were a 
dream or image of a philosopher’s well-regulated regime.99  
In line with Stoic doctrine, there is an emphasis on a single order that sets the standard of living 
together according to nature. In this sense, the koinos nomos can be translated either as “common 
pasture” or “common law,” and it is assumed that this is the equivalent of natural law, as 
understood in early Stoic philosophy. However, there is some question as to what is meant in this 
case by common, given the regard to “all human beings” as citizens of the “well-regulated 
regime.” There is evidence to suggest that Zeno agreed with Chrysippus in holding that only 
sages are capable of performing katorthômata, and in this way would find the majority of 
humanity incapable of living in accordance with the koinos nomos. For this reason, “all human 
beings” should be understood to refer to all those capable of living according to the common law, 
that is, those with the sage’s right reason. In other words, only the wise are really human 
[anthropoid],100 and common means common not to all of humanity “but rather to those who 
perfectly embody human nature.”101 
 There is also the sense that human beings share the koinos nomos by virtue of their natural 
capacity to act in accordance with right reason, even if the actualization of that capacity in a 
universal regime is only a “dream or image.” For, even if the sage is “rarer than the Ethiopian 
phoenix,”102 surely it is possible for any human to become a sage, however unlikely. It is this 
sense that Cicero adapts early Stoic doctrine to support the novel thesis that all mature human 
beings belong to the domain of natural law. Antiochus had argued against Chrysippean 
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psychology, which seemed to him to associate virtue with a kind of mental monism and devalue 
the body and its worldly needs as exemplified by kathêkonta. Cicero appears to follow the 
Antiochean teaching by reinterpreting the formula that law is right reason as applied to conduct 
such that natural law enjoins kathêkonta rather than katorthômata. In other words, “natural law is 
the prescription not strictly of right reason, which only the sage possesses, but of the rationality in 
which all human beings share.”103 Natural law becomes a standard of conduct attainable by all 
moral progressors, and “the strict early Stoic standard that only katorthomata, actions performed 
by an agent who possesses the sage’s right reason, accord with natural law is now relaxed, and 
the basis is laid for the conception in which natural law is specifiable in a code of moral rules.”104 
 
Oikeiosis as a principal of ethical immanence 
Given the differences between the Ciceronian version of oikeiosis, and that of the early Stoics, it is 
worth considering more carefully the way in which the term was initially understood by the 
Stoics. In an essay on “Appropriation,” Daniel Heller-Roazen calls attention to a reflexive 
expression used in Stoic works, oikeiousthai pros heauton, which designates the movement by 
which a living being becomes related to itself and comes to be appropriated to itself. He points 
out that this expression belongs to the set of grammatical forms that developed after the Delphic 
injunction to “know yourself” that flourished in the classical Greek period. However, following 
Simon Pembroke, he argues that the verb oikeiousthai, from which is derived oikeoisis, should be 
construed with a dative or a proposition rather than with an accusative, such that what “becomes 
proper” in the expression is always an indirect object. He also calls attention to the fact that 
Herwig Görgemmanns has shown that the verb, despite its passive meaning, is never 
accompanied by any mention of an agent in the usual sense. The reason for this, is that “[i]n this 
act of becoming related, the ‘someone’ or ‘something’ to which one grows familiar can hardly be 
distinguished from the subject as such.”105 
 Diogenes in Lives of Eminent Philosophers wrote the following with regard to oikeiosis: 
They say that the first impulse that an animal has is to preserve itself, because nature makes it 
proper to itself from the outset, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Ends. He 
says that the first thing that belongs [proton oikeion] is its own constitution and its awareness of 
it.106 
So while oikeiosis constitutes that first impulse common to all living beings that is self-
preservation, this is because from the outset they find themselves assigned to themselves, insofar 
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as the first thing that belongs to them is their awareness of their innate constitution. The impulse 
to self-preservation, then, is the effect of the living being sensing the very constitution to which it 
belongs. Given the way that Heller-Roazen understands the verb oikeiousthai, that is, as bearing on 
an indirect object that cannot be construed as an agent in any common sense of the term, he 
inquires into two key terms supposedly central to Chryssipus’ understanding of oikeiosis: 
“awareness [sunaisthesis, sensus]” and “constitution [sustasis, consitutio]. Certainly it is a matter of 
the attention shown to the self by itself, “to whose cultivation [the Stoics] would most famously 
also turn their explorations of the ‘care of the self [heautou epimelesthai]’,” 107  but it is not 
immediately clear just how one is to understand the structure of this attention. 
“Constitution” is understood more or less unproblematically by Seneca as “the ruling 
faculty disposed in a certain way towards the body,”108 and here there are obvious parallels with 
the natural law tradition of the sixteenth century. A number of scholars, including Anthony Long, 
George Kerferd, Harris Rackham, and Giselle Striker, have translated or interpreted “awareness” 
as “consciousness,” and Heller-Roazen, for his part, says it is “sensation,” which is the focus of his 
work. However, when Seneca writes that “all animals have a sense of their constitution,” he 
seems to be referring to something like knowledge, since he points out that “all animals 
understand the definition of their constitution rather than the constitution itself.” 109  Such 
knowledge must apply to animals, irrational according to the Stoics, and so cannot have the 
rational sense of knowledge as it would otherwise be present in Stoic works. Instead, it is perhaps 
better to interpret “sense of their constitution” in the way that Brad Inwood does, that is, as a 
directedness of animals towards their own disposition. From this perspective, Seneca writes: “An 
animal has a primary attachment to itself; for there must be something to which other things can 
be referred.” 110  Crucially, Seneca suggests at this point that the “awareness” of his own 
constitution is nothing other than that “care of myself” that comes before everything. 
And yet it has already been established that oikeiosis is an indirect relation, complicating 
things further. Heller-Roazen’s analysis becomes particularly helpful here. He suggests that 
Seneca’s care of the self, that comes before everything, suggests nothing less than that the care in 
question “is before” that thing that is “the self.” This is a thesis that seems “by all accounts to also 
have been that of Chrysippus.” And yet, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Heller-Roazen notes, 
introduces a crucial distinction: on the one hand, some Stoics believe that “[what] the animal 
senses as the first thing that belongs is nothing other than itself”; on the other hand, other Stoics, 
“instead, seeking to give a more elegant and precise definition, say that from the moment of birth 
we are appropriated to our constitution and that which preserves it.” This difference between 
“self” and “constitution” is clear. There is a difference at the heart of the living being, “a 
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difference without which it could not come to be itself: the difference between itself and its 
constitution.” That which the animal comes to be assigned and to which it must adapt itself, that 
is, its constitution, is “that element with the animal with which it never altogether coincides.” 
Oikeiosis, then, is the process in which every living being, to be and to preserve itself, must care 
for; “that which each being, rational or not, incessantly senses and never knows.”111 The content 
of care is not given as a body or a self, but is the very constitution of the life of the animal. 
From this perspective, oikeiosis as a harmonization with things and with oneself, is an 
unending process of change, which cannot be delimited by a formula with a fixed and definitive 
content. Despite there being an initial movement which all living beings share, it is only humans 
who can discover harmony within the world, but this cannot be thought of as some kind of 
meaning, given in the divine or by law. It is rather an effect of adapting to circumstance, a kind of 
balance constantly renewed—“the Sage’s equilibrium.”112 The only fixed rule of wisdom and 
virtue is to live without fixed rules, since there can be no preconceived idea of the self which gives 
rise to a projection of prescriptions and force the adoption of a certain position that constitutes 
“oneself.” The only truth to which the subject must accommodate its actions in order to conduct 
itself is an openness to possibilities of conduct, which cannot be generalized in code, but can only 
accede to what Francois Jullien calls “globality.”113 If the self forms a moral unity, the purpose of 
this unity is not to subsume the variety of possible conducts in a general and codifiable form, but 
to allow them to communicate from within. The directedness of the self toward itself, which is 
ultimately an indirect relation, does not accord with a given model but only a variety of models, 
since the totality of ethical decision reappears in each moment of conducting oneself. This is 
nothing less than what the Stoics meant by living in accordance with nature. 
  
Conclusion: Oikeiosis as (counter-)conduct 
Oikeiosis can only be thought as the occupation of a space that cannot be reduced to codification 
and the juridical sphere, and in this sense must be thought of as the very “soul” of counter-
conduct and Foucaultian “spirituality.” Oikeiosis, in opposition to homoiosis, always functions in 
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the mode of the “etho-poetic.”114 Oikeiosis, as a mode of action that is “moral,” is never reducible 
to “an act or series of acts conforming to a rule, a law, or a value.”115 From within oikeiosis, 
counter-conduct cannot be differentiated from conduct in a very real sense, since “a rule of 
conduct is one thing; the conduct that may be measured by this rule is another.” Given a code of 
action or a mode of relating to oneself “there are different ways to ‘conduct oneself’ morally, 
different ways for the acting individual to operate, not just as an agent, but as an ethical subject of 
this action.”116 Natural law theory effectively incorporated a number of these moral experiments 
in such a way that it led to the juridical codification of conduct and the universalization of its 
subject, but the constitution of “another conduct” always lay waiting within it. 
Oikeiosis neatly encapsulates Foucault’s primary concerns in relation to the problem of care 
of the self. Firstly, in relation to “determination of the ethical substance,” the content of every 
moral struggle results from a certain form of self-mastery. But this content will always result from 
vigilance and struggle, and “contradictory movements of the soul” will be the prime material of 
moral practice. Secondly, the way in which individuals relate to rules and regulation and 
recognize their obligation to put them into practice has to do with “the mode of subjection.” 
Regulation, in oikeiosis, is totally immanent, and its only content is given in formulations 
according to the regularity of context, situation, and circumstance. Thirdly, the forms of 
“elaboration of ethical work [travail éthique],” always result from an attempt to transform oneself 
into the ethical subject of one’s behavior, and in this way, and in this way only, to make truth the 
determinant of one’s right action. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the telos of the ethical 
subject, as indicated in oikeiosis, is always a certain mode of being characteristic of the ethical 
subject, a moral conduct that is always also counter-conduct, in which it realizes the very form of 
its self-activity.117 Taken together, these different factors render oikeiosis indistinguishable from a 
veritable ecology of conduct. Ultimately, oikeiosis can be understood as providing the conceptual 
foundation for a “principle of ethical immanence,” operating throughout Foucault’s so-called 
“critique of the subject.” 
A principle of ethical transcendence, on the other hand, places its main emphasis on the 
code and its capacity to adjust to every possible circumstance, since for it the content of moral and 
political struggle is given in advance. Yet perhaps what is most telling about ethical 
transcendence is that because of its mode of regulation, in accordance to such a principle “the 
important thing is to focus on the instances of authority that enforce the code, that require it to be 
learned and observed, that penalize infractions,” even leading to war in extreme cases. Under 
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these conditions, subjectivation occurs in a juridical form, “where the ethical subject refers his 
conduct to a law, or set of laws, to which he must submit at the risk of committing offenses that 
may make him liable to punishment.”118 In this way, conducting oneself and being conducted are 
to two correlative and inseparable aspects of the direction of the subject towards itself. 
Foucault notes that the problem of obedience is “at the center” of his discussion of counter-
conduct.119 However, even if for Stoicism the figure of the sage acts as “a sort of regulating 
principle of behavior,” a kind of ideal that guides the behavior of others, “the most important 
thing about its aim is to lead to a stage at which one no longer needs a director and is able to 
conduct oneself and be the sovereign director of oneself.”120 In the movement of oikeiosis, one is 
guided by natural prescriptions, but this ultimately leads to a phase in which, because of one’s 
mastery, one no longer needs to be conducted. In relation to a principle of ethical transcendence, 
to the contrary, “one always needs to be conducted, even and especially when one conducts.” 
When the possibility of conducting oneself is subsumed under a code, obedience is not 
transitional. There in not a period of life during which one obeys followed by a period in which 
one no longer has to obey, and in the sense “[o]bedience is not a transitional period, it is a state 
[…] in which one must remain until the end of one’s life and with regard to anyone.”121 In a 
society founded on a code of conduct, the government of self is always government through 
others, especially insofar as they govern themselves. 
In such a society, what does obedience produce? Foucault’s response is clear: “obedience 
produces obedience.” If one is to obey, it is not for an external objective, happiness or health, for 
example. One obeys in order to brings one’s actions in line with the code, or in other words, 
“[o]ne obeys to become obedient, in order to produce a state of obedience, a state of obedience so 
permanent and definitive that its subsists even where there is not exactly anyone that one has to 
obey and even before anyone has formulated an order.”122 From this perspective, governing 
oneself is only minimally a directedness toward oneself, and is primarily directedness toward, 
and by, the figure of the other. When directing oneself, the other’s will is always there. Foucault 
writes: 
 
Obedience is and must be a way of being, prior to any order, more fundamental than any 
situation of command and, consequently, the state of obedience in a way anticipates 
relationships with the other person. Even before the other is present and gives you an order, 
you are already in a state of obedience and what direction has to produce is obedience. Or let us 
say again that obedience is at once the condition for direction to function and its end. Obedience 
and direction must therefore coincide, or rather there is a circularity of obedience and direction. 
                                                 
118 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 30. 
119 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 200. 
120 Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-80 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), 267. 
121 Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 268. 
122 Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 270. 
Foucault Studies, No. 21, pp. 22-51 
51 
 
If there is direction it is of course because one is obedient.123 
 
What is significant here in relation to the notion of counter-conduct is that, from the point of view 
of subjectivity that directs itself obediently, in order to care for oneself and by extension others, a 
break with the code of conduct is always merely passive: not conducting oneself properly, or 
misconduct. One’s appropriation of oneself is always in the service of entering into a state of 
proper conduct. 
Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct has “the sole advantage of allowing reference to the 
active sense of the word ‘conduct’—counter-conduct in the sense of struggle against the processes 
implemented for conducting others.”124 When Foucault refers to a “critical ontology of ourselves,” 
it is this active sense of counter-conduct that he has in mind: “an attitude, an ethos, a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical 
analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond 
them.”125 In this sense, the “principal objective” of Foucault’s critique of governmentality is “to 
refuse what we are.” However, such a refusal is always double, since “[w]e have to promote new 
forms of subjectivity while refusing the type of individuality that has been imposed on us for 
several centuries.”126 Such a refusal does not occur by becoming other, or by withdrawal and 
passivity, but by opening to the possibility of other forms of conducting oneself, and thereby 
grasping the means of producing oneself. There is no other form of oneself, towards which one is 
directed in refusal, no hero or dissident. This is the effect of rendering “the autonomous sphere of 
counter-conduct” visible: not positing an autonomy that in being “counter” is essentially other 
than one’s own, but to analyze the components in the way in which one acts in the global field of 
power relations, “making it possible to pick out the dimension or component of counter-conduct 
that may well be found in fact in delinquents, mad people, and patients.”127 What is “counter,” 
then, is an openness to a varied and productive domain of conducts.  
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